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No. 142 37 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a promissory note bearing the 
names of the Defendants-Appellants and others. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff filed its complaint based upon a promis-
sory note bearing the names of the Defendants-Appellants and 
others. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to all 
defendants was granted as to the individual defendants but 
denied as to the corporate defendants whose cases are still 
pending before the trial court, Defendants-Appellants have 
appealed the lower court's order of summary judgment against 
them. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmance of the judg-
ment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-Appellants Tucker (hereinafter referred 
to as "Defendants Tucker") and others executed a promissory 
note to Plaintiff-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
"Plaintiff") on March 26, 1974, in the amount of $150,000.00, 
part of the proceeds therefrom being received by the Defendants 
Simpson, as agreed, for their own benefit and part of the 
proceeds being received, as agreed, by agents of the Defendants 
Simpson as their broker's commission for the transaction. The 
promissory note was executed for the purpose of facilitating 
a sale of certain stock and other interests in Continental 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Account Servicing House, Inc., and Key Account Collection 
House, Inc., both party defendants in this action but not 
participating in this appeal. The seller in this transaction 
was Eugene S. Simpson and the buyers were Mr. and Mrs. Cleon 
D. Tucker and Mr. and Mrs. Willard M. Tucker, all named defen-
dants. 
As partial security for the promissory note, the 
Defendants Tucker were required to and did place into Contin-
ental Account Servicing House, Inc., certain real properties 
valued in excess of $1,000,000.00. As additional security, 
the Defendants Simpson were required to and did place into 
escrow certain stock of the Defendant corporations, constituting 
controlling interest therein. However, on or about June 17, 
'1974, the Defendants Tucker removed the real properties from 
the said corporation, allegedly because they believed them-
selves to have been defrauded by the Defendants Simpson. 
As a result of the transfer of that real property 
out of the corporation, the terms of both the promissory note 
and the contract of sale were breached and Plaintifffs security 
on the note was seriously jeopardized. Plaintiff brought this 
action for judgment on the promissory note. After pleadings 
were filed by all parties, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. 
The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment as against the individual defendants, but inasmuch 
as the court felt the corporate defendants had pled certain 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defenses which established issues of material fact, judgment 
was denied as against the corporate defendants (R.101). 
It was 6 days later that the escrow agent holding 
the stock as security voluntarily deposited said stock with 
the court for disposition as the court deemed proper (R.131A). 
Some six days after that the Defendants Tucker moved the 
court to vacate its judgment (R.105, 111), which motion was 
duly considered by the court and denied (R.130). 
• Some 77 days after the Defendants Tucker had filed 
their answer to Plaintiff's amended complaint (R.51) and 2 3 
days after the court entered judgment against them (R.96), 
Defendants Tucker sought to file an amended answer to amended 
complaint (R.115) without leave of court or opposing counsel. 
This is significant for it is the first point in the pleadings 
wherein Defendants Tucker raise the issue of an "offset" pur-
portedly owing to them (R.120, Fourth Affirmative Defense). 
Also significant is the fact that on August 8, 1975, 
Plaintiff received a letter from Defendants Simpson advising 
Plaintiff that when the Tuckers unlawfully took their real 
property and abandoned the corporation, the Defendants Simpson 
intentionally issued additional stock, thereby destroying the 
value of the stock held as security. 
Defendants Tucker have appealed the trial court's 
decision. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I -
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WERE NO DISPUTED 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT CONTAINED IN ITS 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendants Tucker have raised two major issues as 
purportedly being disputed issues of material fact. The first 
issue concerns an offset which the Defendants Tucker claim is 
owing to them. However, such alleged offset was never pled 
before the court nor did the court ever make a holding con-
cerning any such offset. The second issue is the matter of 
attorney's fees. 
Even a cursory examination of the court's amended 
order granting summary judgment in part (R.101), however, 
will disclose that the matter of attorney's fees was neither 
included in the judgment nor decided, but was, rather, reserved 
for future hearings. Both of these matters will be discussed 
in more detail immediately following. 
A. There is no disputed issue of material fact 
concerning an offset purportedly owing to 
Defendants Tucker since such was never 
alleged in the pleadings before the court. 
Defendants Tucker first introduced their claim to 
an "offset" in their amended answer to amended complaint, 
Fourth Affirmative Defense (R.120). This- is also the only 
portion of the record where they claim an offset. 
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This amended answer was ignored by the trial court, 
and rightly so for several reasons* 
First, the amended answer was filed on August 20, 
1975, 2 3 days after the court entered its order granting 
summary judgment in part (R.96), and 20 days after the 
court entered its amended order granting summary judgment 
in part (R.101). In other words, the issue of an offset was 
first raised by the Defendants Tucker after the case had been 
fully adjudicated as to them. This is simply not the proper 
and timely way to raise an issue. Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.. 
At 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §1207 (1957), this fundamental 
point of logic is inscribed. "A matter will not be considered 
by the appellate court although it may appear in the record 
if it is not properly there." 
Second, the amended answer was filed 77 days after 
the filing of the answer and without leave of either the 
court or opposing counsel as required by Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P. 
Not only was it filed far too late for consideration but also 
it was never properly before the trial court. Such being the 
case, the amended answer must be stricken from the record. 
Third, even if the trial court could have considered 
the issue of offset -- which, of course, was physically impossible 
due to the chronological sequence of the filing of the amended 
answer -- it was never raised by sworn affidavit as is required 
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by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. The affidavit of Willard M. Tucker 
(R.86) states at Paragraph 6 simply that the Tuckers never 
received any of the proceeds of the loan. There was absolutely 
no allegation that an offset was owing or even an allegation 
that the Defendants Tucker should have received some of the 
loan proceeds. in fact, there was no legal or contractual 
requirement that the Tuckers receive any of the proceeds of 
the loan, which, logically, were to be paid to the seller 
and to seller's brokers, and the Tuckers simply were not 
included in that group. Such being the case, they cannot 
now attempt to raise an issue before the appellate court 
which was not before the trial court. 4 C.J.S., Appeal and 
Error, §243 (1957) . 
Defendants Tucker have alleged that the issue of 
"offset" was raised by the court in its minute entry prior 
to the entry of the judgment. However, the minute entry 
cannot be considered under well—established principles of 
law. The court's formal written judgment supersedes all 
previous statements as to the court's intentions. This 
included previbus oral arguments (Newton v. State Road 
Commission, 23 Ut.2d 350, 463 P.2d 565, 567 (1970)) and also, 
more importantly, previous written statements (Cook v. Gardner, 
14 Ut.2d 197, 381 P.2d 78 (1963)). 
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The Cook case, supra, is perhaps the most definitive 
statement on the matter. There the court upheld the formal 
judgment of the trial court which differed, from the minute 
entry, by holding that ". . .of controlling importance is 
the fact that the minute entry is superseded by the document 
signed by the judge which becomes the order of the court. . . ." 
Id. 80. The minute entry could not possibly be construed as 
the judgment of the trial court because it is insufficient to 
act as a judgment under Rule 58(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure where it is stated that "all judgments shall be signed 
by the judge and filed with the clerk." The court's minute 
entry in this case is both unsigned and superseded by the formal 
judgment. 
In Osborne v. Osborne, 60 Wash. 2d 163, 372 P.2d 538 
(1962), that court explained the significance of a minute entry. 
"But an unsigned minute entry is not a 
judgment. As was said in State ex rel 
Thomas v. Lawler, 23 Wash.2d 87, 159 
P.2d 622, p. minute entry made by the 
clerk of the court has nothing to do 
with the final judgment of the court. 
It is merely evidence of what the judge 
has decided to do at the time. He is 
free to change his decision at any time 
before the entry of his final order or 
judgment. If the minute entry is differ-
ent from the judgment entered, it cannot 
be used for the purpose of contradicting 
or impeaching the judgment." Id. 541. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In addition, it must be considered that in the 
present case the trial court had full opportunity to recon-
sider its minute entry and its order when it signed its amended 
order of summary judgment and when it heard and denied Defendants' 
motion to correct amended order (R.105) and Defendants' motion 
for order vacating judgment (R.lll). Even after having con-
sidered the matter on four distinct occasions, the trial court 
refused to disturb its formal order of summary judgment. 
This is the law not only in Utah but also in almost 
all jurisdictions. 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §153 (1969) 
states: 
"The records of the judgment should be 
distinguished from the judge's minutes 
which are merely memoranda which the 
judge makes upon his own docket, for his 
own convenience, to enable him to see 
that the clerk accurately makes up the 
record." 
In Pierce County v. Thurston County, 13 Wash.App. 602, 
536 P.2d 3 (1975), a most recent decision, the court held: 
"Whatever a trial court may assert in an oral or memorandum 
decision has no binding effect unless it is incorporated in 
its formal findings or conclusions." jcd. 4. 
The minute entry was not the court's judgment nor 
was it a pleading. It should not be considered part of the 
record of the court but purely as an informal note evidencing 
what the court was thinking at the time. Such being the case, 
then, it canhdt be considered on appeal. 
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In Southern Pacific Transportation Company v. Lueck, 
11 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975), that court held under its 
Rule 75(h) (which is similar to Rule 75(h), U.R.C.P.) that 
it would follow ". . .the general rule of wide application 
that an appellate court can determine a cause only upon the 
record of the court below." JEd. 614. The Utah decision of 
Williams v. Tuckett, 98 Ut.398, 95 P.2d 982 (1939), follows 
the same rule. This case is particularly relevant to the 
point that a minute entry cannot be considered on appeal 
for any purpose whatsoever. 
"We are of the opinion that there is 
nothing for us on appeal. An appeal 
may not be taken from a minute entry, 
but must be taken from a judgment entered 
upon the order evidenced in the minute 
entry." Id. 982. 
See also Omega Investment Company v. Woolley, 75 Ut. 274, 
284 P. 523 (1930). 
The matter of an offset is not a disputed issue 
of material fact for the simple reason that it was neither 
properly alleged in the pleadings before the court nor ever 
mentioned in any of the court's orders. The first mention 
arises in Appellants1 Brief. The rule is firmly established 
that if a matter was not raised before the trial court it can-
not be raised on appeal. 
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B. There is a disputed issue of material 
fact concerning attorney fees, but 
this is irrelevant to the appeal since 
the trial court reserved the matter 
for future hearings. 
The trial court's reservation of the matter of 
attorney fees i intil a future hearing had the effect of deny-
ing the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to attorney 
fees* This i^^uo, therefore, is sf i 1 i '>etor*.' the tricii 'u.rt; 
1 10 111 ".« * ; v.'Kr:- r .'•..'. * . - • ' > * * » ! . - , * , . ,
 s 
c a s e • i ' - L O j ) . iNe judgment b e i n g a p p e a l e d fror\ J-.-t- f , ' p e l a d e 
a judgment for a t t o n v - , ; «r ^~, aiiu ^m e x e c u t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s 
t o e ' ' <. i utuj * ' • ,. t l le ;>oi'e" • •..*.!!.
 : 
pert\ .VJ ii :nos: certainly not mci .dc a:romey fees. 
The matter oi attorney fet'S .VJ.11 no doubt come 
Pel ore !. no trial court either at trial or on special hearing 
at a lut.ure da:;e. Should a certain amount he awarded eis 
»
T
. : ' . . M ' - ' i - »">--f.'' *. i — < -:•:•-.:. *;-;.,:• - i - s T s * *• - • ^ ; be separate 
• ii'id distinct from cne; judgment in issue at \.rv present time. 
Plaintiff vo':h: point, oui. to the -.'ourt-, the*\ * hat i t concedes 
1
 hfp" . ;ue.--: .i •: ; i ;' M : ^ .i. oei. -•:•-, • = !. d ispi i t e , bi it 
Plaintiff won "id also point oat chat the trial court's judgment 
:«
jcognJ7od th^t ^a^4- ^nH denied n1 * in' I : ^  ' r motion tor summary 
.*•"'•• * * '.:; '••< "< .3- cour t's own judgment, 
: n< m a t f e i o i " ' i M i i i K !• - ^ , i s r e s e r v e d i o v • f u t u r e h e a l i n g . 
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POINT II 
THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT 
AND PROPER AND WAS FULLY WITHIN ITS POWER 
AND AUTHORITY. 
The Defendants Tucker claim in their brief that 
the trial court grossly exceeded its power and authority by 
granting summary judgment to the Plaintiff. They have taken 
issue with the trial court's judgment on three major points, 
each of which is discussed immediately following. 
A. The trial court is limited in its decision 
neither by the pleadings of Plaintiff nor 
by the terms of the breached agreement. 
Particularly in the present case, the trial court 
was not restricted in the relief it could afford the Plaintiff 
by Plaintiff's prayer for specific relief. This is the well-
settled rule and is stated at 49 C.J.S., Judgments, §49 (1947). 
"In contested cases, or cases in which an 
answer has been filed, the relief which 
may be granted is not limited to that de-
manded in the complaint or specifically 
prayed for, particularly under statutes 
in effect so providing; the court may 
grant any relief which is consistent with 
the case made by the pleadings and proof 
and embraced within the issues." Id. 113. 
The same section further states that when there are claims for 
both general and specific relief, the court's alternatives are 
not limited by the request for specific relief. 
"Where a prayer for general relief is added 
to the demand of specific relief, the court 
is not limited to the specific demand, but 
may grant, particularly under code practice, 
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such, other appropriate relief as may 
be consistent witli the allegations and 
proofs and necessary to adjust fully 
the equities of the case, " Id. ] ] 4. 
Such „i s the situation in the present case. Plaintiff's 
amended complaint contains a demand for specific relief (I-.39, 
ff ] - 3) ai id a demand for general relief ( R ,40, f4) , The Utah, 
courts are in agreement with the general rule which allows 
the trial court to grant relief as it chooses,, Ii I Walker v. 
Singleton, 63 I Jt. 283, 225 P. 8„] (1,924)., this court: held: 
"It may also be the case that, where both 
specific and general relief are prayed for, 
as in this case, the court may not follow 
the prayer for specific relief, but may 
grant general relief. Such seems to have 
been the course pursued in the case at bar. 
The objection, therefore, that the relief 
granted by the court, was broader than the 
specific relief prayed for, i s not tenabl e." • 
Id. 82. 
The )efenaant:s Tucker have also argued that the trial 
court was \i\ui • ; .;;; t. he relief crr-mted by its judgment to the 
express terms or Mo"; h*'.-.-iel-eci .•{: •'-w-o -. , > • /,.•.•. , -* 
not appropriate m this case for taae reason that this act J on 
is for breach of performance on a promissory note contract and 
not for the pea 1< > ana nee of a contract. 
It must also be added at this point, that, it is almost 
unconscionable for the Defendants ruckor to argue t -iat Plaint,,, i ff 
is restri c :ted t x:> the re] i e„f < if to: -a.-.i oy i he terms : f the agreement 
when the Defendants Tucker have, been directly responsible for 
destroying all the security and, a J ] of 1 ,„1 i„e aa ? ei rues • • <-j ief 
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open to the Plaintiff under the contract. Defendants Tucker 
have accomplished this by being the initial parties to breach 
the contract by their withdrawal from the corporation of the 
real properties they had placed therein as security for the 
promissory note, thereby withdrawing the real properties 
from the terms of the agreement. Next, the Defendants Tucker 
completely abandoned the corporation to the Simpsons, thereby 
allowing the Simpsons to destroy completely the value of the 
stock held as security by issuing new stock which destroyed 
the controlling interest once held as collateral. 
It is fundamental to the doctrine that a court 
may determine matters on the basis of public policy that 
a party should not be allowed to destroy completely all of 
the security in a contractual agreement and then require the 
injured party to look only to that security for relief. By 
their own conduct the Defendants Tucker have come into this 
court without "clean hands" and are estopped from claiming 
that the Plaintiff can look only to the security outlined in 
the terms of the agreement. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, §136 (1966) . 
The Defendants Tucker were the parties initially in 
breach of the contract and did everything within their power to 
destroy the collateral held for Plaintiff. They cannot now 
demand that this court restrict Plaintiff's remedy solely to 
acquisition of the now worthless stock. The trial court's 
decision was most certainly not limited by the terms of the 
breached agreement. 
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B. The trial court was fully empowered to 
enter a personal judgment against the 
Defendants and to provide that the 
security held by the court should be 
sold t:o satisfy such judgment. 
Defendants Tucker have at.tacked the actions of the 
: . ! - •. * . ' . v - ; -1 • •* * ,, .as in viuldti-.- >f tl e 
supposed "cue action ru.l<. \fe-7b •"• IT n & , * an^ h.ive c \ IL<; 
b o eases . > aapport thereof, o^.o <,f which is a lit a: decision. 
(Appc , . ..in • -v i , * i «• • ' M ^ *•• 
*rwj t » '- ^ i::e:- « piitru] "i *e f orcc 1 c * vure :-f mortgages upon leal 
* ^
r
 st' inu personal paer- r * *" However, Oofonciants Tuck* r 
have ripparcnt Iv over, uoked the fact tl lat for the past: 3 0 years : 
that statute and the Utah case fo] lowi i ig it have been stricken 
I 3 . 
Kir che past 10 years §§78-37-1 and 78-37-2 hive 
expressly uvl purposely omitted any reference +o personal 
pit [^  • ",a • ' . * i i iclude tl: le s t o c k <_ : - .: - :i n 
•he present case, See §78-37- ] , I J.C.A. (n. 1 975 supp.). 
The Legislature's removal of personal property foreclosure 
actioi is from the purview of these statutes can on! ^  be inter-
preted as a legislative determination that the provisions of 
• - ..* ifu'-es shall definitely exclude
 a ctions dealing with 
person*;! property. ^he reason for this is that in that same 
year the Utah Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code 
'<•••/:•:- y:- ei ,t ;: inq and superseding -ay other stat.-a- 'c^rr,!-
i ng security agreements and personal property. §70A-9-- 1.02 (1^53, 
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"History"). Simply stated, the law relied upon by Defendants 
Tucker was repealed 10 years ago. See also Hubbs vs. Warehouse 
Service Commission, infra. 
When the courts are dealing with security interests 
and chattel mortgages, the scope of their authority is quite 
broad. It is stated at 15 Am.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, §233 
(1964): 
"When a court exercising equitable powers 
acquires jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose 
• . a chattel mortgage, it has the right to 
decide all matters involved in the suit. . . . 
Moreover, the court has inherent power to 
make supplemental orders affecting the 
details of the performance of its decree." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Concerning the performance of its decree, the case 
of Betty v. Tuer, 292 S.W. 271 (Tex.Civ.App., 1927) is instructive. 
In that case the court exercised the broad scope of its power 
to decree an order concerning a promissory note and foreclosure 
of a chattel mortgage by ordering that the plaintiff could 
execute on the mortgaged truck or any other property of the 
Defendant. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. 
In the present case the court entered a personal 
judgment against the Defendants Tucker in the amount of $151,878.75 
plus $52.10 court costs. Ordinarily, it would probably be most 
appropriate for the Plaintiff to seek to levy on whatever of 
Defendants1 property that it wished. Owing, however, to the 
unusual circumstances of this case wherein the escrow agent 
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deposi ted the stock i i i questi on •.- • * >, - .- * * 
proceeding would seem somewhat, futjie since the cour1 "i I ready 
had possessi on of the stock. Therefore, the court, was perfectly 
justified in couching i ts order i n the terms of a foreclosure 
proceeding since it already possessed the stoci- . • «.s the 
< v M '. - • a - J : • p *:\J * • . , . . _ . ^ i • 
states, "Process to enforce a judgment shall, be by a w n . 
execution unless the court otherwise directs, (Emphasis 
. t- {; e d • ) T h e c o u r t, h a d i t w i s h e d, c o u 1 d e v e i I I I a. v e o r d e r e d 11: i a t 
ii] ')i i ne real property owned by the Defendants Tucker or any 
o : - e n oi icioiav be sold to sa t is fy the judgment. 
P a 1 a &°>{^x i . _>r. 'iiiis the court ^ould not oc , I t simp'iv 
'^nioie'i J personal judgment and s ta ted that '" h Laint if f may 
s- " , , • t J ^ s i - : . , • . , . < . • 
r ' - ~ i r i * ' v t - • • « # • ' < s , . . 
'cin itself was holdui- i he security, such an order- -a; neces-
sary r enable th*j Plaint iff ro I ev-. or i Vio stock. :-f 'r"he 
: ..aiat -: ,• • i - . :i<~i it': i .••. ;* -• ;i:.;gm.--a ;-.--.i J :;:.-.; >.. ; e r u r i - . - n r . • ••..:;KC.T 
which became a lieu oa t'Jxe Tuckers' real property pursuant to 
§78-22-1, U.C.A., that <mi is m no wav invalid oi vuia because 
the Plaii rtiff chose to levy on the stoc'i, iirst. 
The case law concern MI-J foreclosure at chattel nioi t -
gages has til irougl i the ;p i- i- •.* « :• . * r j t
 f. i * 
judgment may very easily accompany o decree ci 1 o rec , osui o, 
the divorce ca^o? cited by Defendants Tucker notwithstanding 
• •"•.ppeii ....-, n: ,..v, ] 3- 1 4) . - , ,. 
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In Lassen v. Curtis, 40 Wash.2d 82, 241 p.2d 210 
(1952), the court held under a statute similar in its alter-
natives to our Uniform Commercial Code that a personal judgment 
for the balance due would be entered along with a decree of 
foreclosure on the personal property held as security. It is 
important to note that the court neither objected to nor 
noted as unusual the fact that the trial court's judgment 
both foreclosed the chattel mortgage and awarded a personal 
judgment. 
"Since they [plaintiffs] held, in the 
form of a promissory note, a separate 
obligation for the sum due, appellants 
asked for and received in addition to 
a decree of foreclosure a personal judg-
ment for the balance due upon the note. 
This was in accordance with the provisions 
of the. . .statute." Id. 211-12.(Emphasis 
added.) 
In Hubbs v. Warehouse Service Commission, 149 Ore. 
559, 42 P.2d 180 (1935), the plaintiff sued for both a personal 
judgment against the defendants and for an order allowing the 
sale of the personal property held as security. The trial 
court so ordered and its decision was affirmed on appeal. 
"Upon the trial a judgment was entered in 
favor of plaintiff for the full amount 
: of the principal of the notes with unpaid 
interest, attorney's fees, and costs, and 
a decree for the foreclosure of the mort-
gage and sale of the mortgaged property was 
likewise entered." Id. 181. 
The court then went on to state that it even foresaw 
a duty of the trial court to enter both a personal judgment and 
a decree of foreclosure. 
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"The subject of the mortgage in the 
instant case was personal and not real 
property. In addition to the mortgage, 
notes were given evidencing the indebted-
ness and it became the duty of the court 
in the. foreclosure proceedings to enter 
judgment against the defendants for the 
full amount due on the notes. . . . 
Section 6-505 Oregon Code (1930), relied 
upon by defendants, applies c ily to siiits 
for the foreclosure of mortn-< <>s on real 
property and hence has no beaming here." 
Id. 1R4. 
Tins i *; particularly relevant to he case at bar 
f
 * ' - i ' t, j;efoiuiants Tucker have - • .;i • :. ; -u ,]_.-• 
a sratutc which applies only to the foreclosure of real estate 
mortgages f§7b-j7-x, U.^.^., sup3 -\j and is, therefore, 
irrelevant. . . .• , . 
The i riiform Commercial rode, idopted by Ut. ah ui 1985, 
v-"o i \*> \ - - *•-,( i r . i I v, [ <-1 i-.-M w (\ . ( <; </i,^ ro ,» soci,: . tv aoroe-
incnf is mvoj\,x>d. These remedies include decrees of foreclosure, 
porsona I mnn^y judgments, cxonit imiq and ^if ] i ke. It has been 
SLr;i.t:'.; • :-J 1 i -• -'' J t •• • J v - i , M M " •?!*•;-;:-.: ; -llH-i J i L' :.-• _!.(' C u m u l a t i v e Jf;vi 
that "i party need not: elect one or the other. 
"Generally, the remedies provided under 
Article IX are cumulative, and a party 
may sue on a debt secured by the security 
agreement without waiving his security 
interest." Boyce, The Uniform Commercial 
Code in Utah, 3] Utah L.Rev. 70 (1 966). 
Sec t i on 7 0 A- 9 - 5 01 (5) , U. C . A. , make s it e L <. -* r in a t 
after a plaintiff has obtained a mor ley ad.'imc.-r.: \;: * . .\.*r i 
defendant, if may proceed to execute or foreclose upon 
collateral, as was done in the present case. 
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"When a secured party has reduced his 
claim to judgment the lien of any levy 
which may be made upon his collateral 
by virtue of any execution based upon 
the judgment shall relate back to the 
date of the perfection of the security 
interest in such collateral, A judicial 
sale, pursuant to such execution, is a 
foreclosure of the security interest by 
judicial procedure within the meaning 
of this section. . . . " 
§70A-9-501(l) illustrates that a plaintiff is 
not limited in the procedural remedies available to it. 
. "When a debtor is in default under a 
security agreement, a secured party has 
the rights and remedies provided in 
this part. . . . He may reduce his 
f/ claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise 
enforce the security interest by any avail-
able judicial procedure." (Emphasis added.) 
:.•;...-•<.<• Defendants Tucker are apparently arguing that where 
Plaintiff has been granted a money judgment for a sum certain, 
it cannot foreclose on the collateral but must proceed to 
execute on the property of the Defendants by some sort of 
distinct procedure. Official Comment 6 to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code §9-501 indicates that a plaintiff may choose 
either to foreclose or to execute following judgment. "A judi-
cial sale following judgment, execution and levy is one of 
the methods of foreclosure contemplated by §§1. . . . " 
Under the relevant Utah statutory provisions, then, 
Plaintiff was fully entitled to a personal money judgment 
against the Defendants Tucker and was also entitled to execute 
on the stock held in the custody of the court. 
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. • The Defendants Tucker have arcrued tnat in-.s r< carmen t 
could ,:ot act as a personal judgment against them s .iicv *.hc 
"•;• - i.. ^ oiucl ov; prevented H;"r<^ n -v:<w_
 ; >; > M u ^  -ell 
LiaDiiiLy o: the Defendants." Appell.ii.Ls' rtii^f, -.) 'r ; . • 
certainly not the case, 
The trial co- i • >";- it i\ ^ v.r--c run^i'v : 
certain (R.102). The manter oi attorney fees n\. i:;r •-; .^.*-
judgment, and. if attorney fees ire i; It irately iwardoa, thtv 
v.-i 11 o.-nsi li'Jte a separate judgment. •; • , . - . . Judgments §>4zz 
\ i.r)4"} . The judgment aiLowed Plaintiff to place a • ien on ; i i i. 
•aopoiiy *' ' iii- ;^ .''t'\.di: t- ' : ••*• r . ' e :::oi inty 
and further aJ lowed the Plaintiff u.> ::;e:.l the stock held by 
the court. The court's order did not require Plaintiff to seJ1 
• i1'* .^'L •;-C"u ;•* Joi«- <*i:;i \\- i .u i IL^^'H- < < - :, but merely allowed 
Plainti:f to execute on \ lie .-Lock KS though it: were held "by 
the Defendants themselves. bui-t *5n ov"d< r was necessary in view 
of the fact that the stock was held by the court and a court 
order was required to release it. 
C. The creation of a lien fay the trial court's 
judgment is not a proper subject for appeal 
since the trial court had no authority to 
"create" a lien, nor does the record indi-
cate that it did so, and this court cannot 
review a matter that was never before the 
trial court." 
The trial court's amended order granting summary judg-
ment was absolutely proper in holding the Defendants Tucker liable 
on the note amount and in R!lowing the Plaintiff to execute on 
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the stock held as security, which stock had been deposited 
with the court prior to the court's final order on this matter 
(R.131, 131A). Defendants Tucker have presented no evidence 
whatsoever in the record that the trial court's judgment is 
acting as a lien on the Defendant's real estate "in Utah 
County, Carbon County, Duchesne County, Sanpete County (and 
Davis County) and perhaps in other counties. . . . " (Appellants' 
Brief, 6). It is the law in the State of Utah and in other 
jurisdictions that a judgment does not create a lien and if 
a party is objecting to a lien he must show evidence thereof. 
In Orton v. Adams, 21 Ut.2d 245, 444 P.2d 62 (1968), the court 
stated: 
"Thus, it is seen that it is not the judg-
ment but the docketing thereof which creates 
the lien. Over 2000 acres of the land in 
question are not in the county where the judg-
ment was rendered. The record does not show 
that a transcript of the judgment was ever 
filed in the office of the clerk of the 
district court in the county where the land 
lies." Id. 63-4. 
Defendants Tucker's objection to the alleged docket-
ing of the judgment in outlying counties is not supported by 
the record. In the absence of any part of the record evidencing 
a docketing of the judgment in outlying counties, this court 
has but one alternative and that is described at 4A C.J.S., 
Appeal and Error, §1203(a). 
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"The court on appeal will not consider 
questions arising after judgment unless 
properly raised and supported by a 
record sufficient to enable the court 
to determine whether error has been 
committed." 
The Defendants Tucker state that they are fearful 
that title companies will slander their title and that the 
judgment will be docketed in outlying counties. There is 
no proof of this before the court except the acknowledged 
fears of the Defendants Tucker. Were these fears based on 
more concrete evidence, we could better sympathize with 
their position. However, as it is stated in 4A C.J.S., 
Appeal and Error, §12 06, "The appellate court can only take 
the record as it finds it and cannot. . .consider matters 
which lie in the imagination or apprehension of court or 
counsel." 
In addition to being concerned about the possibly 
slanderous future activities of title companies (Appellants' 
Brief, 15), Defendants Tucker are also apprehensive that pro-
spective purchasers may be dissuaded from buying by virtue 
of any purported liens on their property (Appellants' Brief, 
supra). However, it is stated at 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 
§1324(2), 388 (1958): "The probable effect of a judgment on 
third parties is not a legitimate basis for an argument 
addressed to an appellate tribunal." See also 5 C.J.S., 
Appeal and Error, §1497(d). 
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If the Defendants Tucker have an objection to the 
docketing of the judgment, they must present evidence to the 
court that the judgment was indeed docketed in outlying counties. 
Further, they should not attack the judgment itself, which 
creates no lien, but rather they should object to the county 
clerk's office in those outlying counties where they allege 
the judgment is docketed or to the title companies who they 
insist will slander the title or to the prospective purchasers 
who breach their sales contracts with Defendants. 
There has been no evidence before the trial court 
or before this court in the record on appeal that the judgment 
in question was ever docketed in outlying counties. Neither 
can the District Court of Salt Lake County be responsible for 
whatever interpretations title companies and prospective pur-
chasers may choose to place on a judgment so docketed. This 
matter is both unsubstantiated and inappropriate for appellate 
review. 
CONCLUSION 
The court in the present case was faced with an 
unusual situation where the court itself held possession of 
the collateral on a secured transaction. The court entered 
judgment in a sum certain on the promissory note and allowed 
the Plaintiff to execute on the stock held b y the court. The 
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trial court's order was completely appropriate to the 
circumstances of this case, and the court's judgment is 
supported fully by Utah statutory law and case authority. 
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
320 South 300 East, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief to Arthur H. Nielsen and David 
S. Cook, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants Tucker, 200 North 
Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, this / day of January, 
1976, postage prepaid. 
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